IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/compsc/v28y2011i4p377-401.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001

Author

Listed:
  • Todd S. Sechser

Abstract

The study of military coercion is a central topic in international relations, and in recent years research on coercive threats has yielded a long list of important theoretical innovations. In 1960, Thomas Schelling drew a distinction between threats meant to deter and those designed to compel , but empirical research about coercion has paid much more attention to deterrence than compellence. This is problematic because deterrence and compellence are thought to operate according to different dynamics. This article introduces the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset, which is designed specifically to help test hypotheses about the use and effectiveness of compellent threats in international politics. I describe the rationale behind the dataset, present coding procedures and basic descriptive statistics, and offer comparisons to several related datasets.

Suggested Citation

  • Todd S. Sechser, 2011. "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 377-401, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:28:y:2011:i:4:p:377-401
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894211413066
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0738894211413066
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0738894211413066?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    2. Huth, Paul & Gelpi, Christopher & Bennett, D. Scott, 1993. "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 609-623, September.
    3. Weeks, Jessica L., 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 35-64, January.
    4. James Fearon, 2002. "Selection Effects and Deterrence," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(1), pages 5-29, January.
    5. Darren Filson & Suzanne Werner, 2004. "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 296-313, April.
    6. Sechser, Todd S., 2010. "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 627-660, October.
    7. Fearon, James D., 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 577-592, September.
    8. Trager, Robert F., 2010. "Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 347-368, May.
    9. Kurizaki, Shuhei, 2007. "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 543-558, August.
    10. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(4), pages 533-547, November.
    11. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    12. Langlois, Catherine C. & Langlois, Jean-Pierre P., 2006. "When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War: Rational Escalation and the Failure of Bargaining," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 645-669, October.
    13. Gelpi, Christopher F. & Griesdorf, Michael, 2001. "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(3), pages 633-647, September.
    14. James D. Fearon, 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 68-90, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Scott Wolford, 2020. "War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 235-261, April.
    2. Matthew Hauenstein, 2020. "The conditional effect of audiences on credibility," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(3), pages 422-436, May.
    3. Brock F. Tessman & Steve Chan, 2004. "Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 131-153, April.
    4. Michael C. Horowitz & Philip Potter & Todd S. Sechser & Allan Stam, 2018. "Sizing Up the Adversary," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(10), pages 2180-2204, November.
    5. Peter Bils & William Spaniel, 2017. "Policy bargaining and militarized conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 647-678, October.
    6. Muhammet A Bas & Curtis S Signorino & Taehee Whang, 2014. "Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-34, January.
    7. Yuleng Zeng, 2020. "Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(6), pages 633-654, November.
    8. Giacomo Chiozza, 2017. "Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 3-26, January.
    9. Stephane Wolton, 2024. "Decentralised information transmission in the shadow of conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 64-82, January.
    10. Colin Krainin & John Slinkman, 2017. "Bargaining with a biased autocrat," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 273-298, April.
    11. Scott Helfstein, 2012. "Liabilities of Globalization: Sovereign Debt, International Investors and Interstate Conflict with Other People's Money," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 277-288, December.
    12. Andrew H. Kydd & Roseanne W. McManus, 2017. "Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 325-348, February.
    13. Olga Chyzh, 2014. "Can you trust a dictator: A strategic model of authoritarian regimes’ signing and compliance with international treaties," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 3-27, February.
    14. Xiaojun Li & Dingding Chen, 2021. "Public opinion, international reputation, and audience costs in an authoritarian regime," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 543-560, September.
    15. John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.
    16. David R. Andersen-Rodgers, 2015. "No table necessary? Foreign policy crisis management techniques in non-state actor-triggered crises," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(2), pages 200-221, April.
    17. Thomas Jensen & Andreas Madum, 2017. "Partisan optimism and political bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 191-213, April.
    18. HEIFETZ, Aviad & SEGEV, Ella, 2003. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    19. Paul A. Papayoanou, 1997. "Intra-Alliance Bargaining and U.S. Bosnia Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 91-116, February.
    20. Alexandra Guisinger & Alastair Smith, 2002. "Honest Threats," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(2), pages 175-200, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:28:y:2011:i:4:p:377-401. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.