IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/asseca/v6y2019i1p30-54.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes

Author

Listed:
  • Eryan Ramadhani

Abstract

China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has drawn international attention, especially in the past decade. Yet China has not always resorted to assertive foreign policy. Efforts to de-escalate tension are evident despite the domestic preference for tougher action. This study centres on a question: what makes for China’s assertiveness. I argue that China’s assertive foreign policy originates in leaders’ domestic consideration. Utilizing audience costs theory I focus on two assumptions that need to be relaxed: unitary domestic audiences and consistency in leaders’ crisis behaviour. China’s non-unitary domestic audiences, namely the elites and public, have different interests, although they share support for assertiveness in the South China Sea. Domestic audiences can tolerate inconsistency insofar as leaders are able to justify their decision, that is, to de-escalate the South China Sea disputes without dropping assertiveness. Foreign policy decision-making in China remains somewhat opaque, but domestic audiences can influence the process albeit not directly. In this regard, China’s assertiveness serves to generate audience costs so as to underpin regime legitimacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Eryan Ramadhani, 2019. "Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes," Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, , vol. 6(1), pages 30-54, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:asseca:v:6:y:2019:i:1:p:30-54
    DOI: 10.1177/2347797018823342
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2347797018823342
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/2347797018823342?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert F. Trager & Lynn Vavreck, 2011. "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 526-545, July.
    2. Joshua D. Kertzer & Ryan Brutger, 2016. "Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(1), pages 234-249, January.
    3. Kurizaki, Shuhei & Whang, Taehee, 2015. "Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 949-980, October.
    4. Weeks, Jessica L., 2012. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 326-347, May.
    5. Weeks, Jessica L., 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 35-64, January.
    6. King, Gary & Pan, Jennifer & Roberts, Margaret E., 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 326-343, May.
    7. Downes, Alexander B. & Sechser, Todd S., 2012. "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 457-489, July.
    8. Snyder, Jack & Borghard, Erica D., 2011. "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(3), pages 437-456, August.
    9. Fearon, James D., 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 577-592, September.
    10. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1998. "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 829-844, December.
    11. Milan W. Svolik, 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 477-494, April.
    12. Weiss, Jessica Chen, 2013. "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 1-35, January.
    13. Jack S. Levy & Michael K. McKoy & Paul Poast & Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, 2015. "Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(4), pages 988-1001, October.
    14. Chaudoin, Stephen, 2014. "Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 235-256, January.
    15. Brutger, Ryan & Kertzer, Joshua D., 2018. "A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 693-724, July.
    16. Tomz, Michael, 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 821-840, October.
    17. James D. Fearon, 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 68-90, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xiaojun Li & Dingding Chen, 2021. "Public opinion, international reputation, and audience costs in an authoritarian regime," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 543-560, September.
    2. Matthew Hauenstein, 2020. "The conditional effect of audiences on credibility," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(3), pages 422-436, May.
    3. Gregory J. Moore & Christopher B. Primiano, 2020. "Audience Costs and China’s South China Sea Policy," Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, , vol. 7(3), pages 325-348, December.
    4. Giacomo Chiozza, 2017. "Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 3-26, January.
    5. Michael C. Horowitz & Philip Potter & Todd S. Sechser & Allan Stam, 2018. "Sizing Up the Adversary," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(10), pages 2180-2204, November.
    6. Andrew H. Kydd & Roseanne W. McManus, 2017. "Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 325-348, February.
    7. Matthew Wilson & Carla Martinez Machain, 2018. "Militarism and Dual-Conflict Capacity," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(1), pages 156-172, January.
    8. Daniel L. Nielson & Susan D. Hyde & Judith Kelley, 2019. "The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society views of international election observers," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 685-715, December.
    9. David H. Bearce & Thomas R. Cook, 2018. "The first image reversed: IGO signals and mass political attitudes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 595-619, December.
    10. Scott Wolford, 2020. "War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 235-261, April.
    11. Thomas Zeitzoff, 2018. "Does Social Media Influence Conflict? Evidence from the 2012 Gaza Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(1), pages 29-63, January.
    12. Viskupič Filip, 2020. "More Valuable than Blood and Treasure? Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Status on Domestic Preferences for Military Intervention," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 26(4), pages 1-20, December.
    13. Keren Yarhi-Milo & Joshua D. Kertzer & Jonathan Renshon, 2018. "Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(10), pages 2150-2179, November.
    14. Christopher Gelpi, 2017. "Democracies in Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(9), pages 1925-1949, October.
    15. Colton Heffington & Brandon Beomseob Park & Laron K Williams, 2019. "The “Most Important Problem†Dataset (MIPD): a new dataset on American issue importance," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(3), pages 312-335, May.
    16. Yuleng Zeng, 2020. "Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(6), pages 633-654, November.
    17. Seung-Whan Choi, 2010. "Legislative Constraints: A Path to Peace?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(3), pages 438-470, June.
    18. Jesse C. Johnson, 2016. "Alliance treaty obligations and war intervention," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(5), pages 451-468, November.
    19. Meckling, Jonas & Nahm, Jonas, 2019. "The politics of technology bans: Industrial policy competition and green goals for the auto industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 470-479.
    20. Aaron R Kaufman, 2020. "Implementing novel, flexible, and powerful survey designs in R Shiny," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-15, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:asseca:v:6:y:2019:i:1:p:30-54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.