IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rpo/ripoec/v96y2006i1p91-114.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Auction Formats and Award Rules in Swedish Procurement Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Sofia Lundberg

    (Umeå University)

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical analysis of outcomes from Swedish procurement auctions given award criterion and auction format. The auctions are single-unit sealed bid auctions or their simultaneous counterpart and contracts can be awarded to the lo west bidder or in accordance with qualitative criteria. The empirical results provide no evidence of differences in winning bids depending on the auction format. The award rule on the other hand matters; a horizontal comparison shows higher winning bids on contracts awarded to other than the lowest bidder. The effect of bidder interaction and bidder identity is also considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Sofia Lundberg, 2006. "Auction Formats and Award Rules in Swedish Procurement Auctions," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 96(1), pages 91-114, January-F.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:91-114
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2006/gen-feb/lundberg.php
    Download Restriction: Payment required
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raventós, Pedro & Zolezzi, Sandro, 2015. "Electronic tendering of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Chile," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(12), pages 2569-2578.
    2. Sundström, David, 2016. "A Comparison of Techniques to Evaluate Policies in Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies 928, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Jun 2016.
    3. Jorge González Chapela, 2019. "Weight Values, Scoring Rules and Abnormally Low Tenders Criteria in Multidimensional Procurement: Effects on Price," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 228(1), pages 55-81, March.
    4. Albano, Gian Luigi & Dini, Federico & Zampino, Roberto, 2008. "Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 46547, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:91-114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sabrina Marino (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.