Financial Distress And Banks'communication Policy In Crisis Times
Abstract
This paper analyzes banks’ communication policies in crisis times and the role of imperfect information in enhancing banks' financial distress. If banks differ in their exposure to dubious assets, fragile banks may claim to be sound only in order to manipulate investors' expectations. Then sound banks must pay a larger interest rate than in a perfect information set-up. A stronger sanction for false information would improve the situation of the low-risk banks but would deteriorate the situation of the high-risk banks. The total effect on the economy-wide frequency of default of credit institutions is ambiguous. It can be shown that, in some cases, the optimal sanction is lower than the sanction that rules out any manipulatory behavior.Download Info
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Article provided by Institute for Economic Forecasting in its journal Romanian Journal for Economic Forecasting.
Volume (Year): (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 5-20
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Handle: RePEc:rjr:romjef:v::y:2010:i:1:p:5-20
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Related research
Keywords: financial distress; financial crisis; banks; disclosure; transparency;Other versions of this item:
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2008. "Financial distress and banks' communication policy in crisis times," ESSEC Working Papers DR 08018, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Claudio Borio, 2008. "The financial turmoil of 2007-?: a preliminary assessment and some policy considerations," BIS Working Papers 251, Bank for International Settlements.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1991. " Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1325-59, September.
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"Public Disclosure and Bank Failures,"
IMF Working Papers
97/96, International Monetary Fund.
- Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 1998. "Public Disclosure and Bank Failures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(1), pages 110-131, March.
- Cordella, Tito & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, 1998. "Public Disclosure and Bank Failures," CEPR Discussion Papers 1886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk,"
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Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 733-62, November.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2005. "Socially Efficient Managerial Dishonesty," ESSEC Working Papers DR 05005, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Vranceanu, Radu, 2009.
"Four Myths and a Financial Crisis,"
ESSEC Working Papers
DR 09006, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Radu Vranceanu, 2009. "Four Myths and a Financial Crisis," Post-Print hal-00554704, HAL.
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