The 1.5th Mover Advantage
AbstractThere has been much discussion about the timing of moves in games. However, one assumption usually goes unquestioned, namely, that of an irrevocable commitment of the first mover. In many cases this is not realistic, since final commitments are often preceded by actions that are binding only to a limited degree: partial commitments. An example is the announcements of price changes. I analyze a game in which the degree of a partial commitment is endogenized. In the case of strategic complements, a player profitably makes use of the possibility to commit partly. She chooses a role somewhere between first and second mover, which gives her a 1.5th-mover advantage.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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