Cash and Share Renting: An Empirical Test of the Link Between Entrepreneurial Ability and Contractual Choice
AbstractWhy do rent, wage, and sharecropping contracts exist simultaneously? One possibility is that contract types distinguish between workers with different endowments of managerial ability. This article describes an empirical test of the link between managerial ability and contract choice.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (1981)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Bierlen, Ralph W. & Parsch, Lucas D. & Dixon, Bruce L., 1999. "How Cropland Contract Type And Term Decisions Are Made: Evidence From An Arkansas Tenant Survey," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA), vol. 2(01).
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1998. "Renegotiation-proof tenurial contracts as screening mechanisms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, June.
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