Redistribution et incitations au travail. Une application empirique simple de la fiscalité optimale
Abstract
[eng] Redistribution and labour supply incentives: a simple application of the optimal tax theory. . A growing concern appeared in many developed countries during the last ten years that generous redistribution systems might be detrimental to those they want to help. By guaranteeing a minimum income or an income supplement to those whose purchasing power would fall below some limit, these systems would be responsible for strong labour-supply disincentives, the cost of which may be very high. In a static framework and under alternative specifications of the labour supply elasticities and the social welfare function, we show, in this paper, that, even if such a mechanism is not in complete disagreement with the Mirrlees optimal tax model, the difference between optimal and real tax rates can be high. The proposed implementation of the optimal tax model can be considered as an original alternative to the standard econometric approach to the analysis of fiscal reforms. [fre] En offrant une garantie de revenu minimum à ceux dont le revenu primaire se trouve en dessous d'un niveau de vie acceptable, les systèmes de redistribution en vigueur dans la plupart des pays européens pourraient détourner du marché du travail, peut-être durablement, les bénéficiaires de cette garantie. Dans une perspective statique et sous des hypothèses alternatives concernant l'élasticité de l'offre de travail et la fonction de bien-être social, on montre ici que, si un tel dispositif n'est pas en complet désaccord avec les enseignements d'un modèle de fiscalité optimale à la Mirrlees, les différences obtenues entre les barèmes optimaux et les barèmes réels de redistribution peuvent néanmoins être considérables. La mise en œuvre proposée ici du modèle de fiscalité optimale constitue une alternative originale aux approches économétriques standard des effets d'une réforme fiscale.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 51 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 473-487
Note: DOI:10.2307/3503138
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Amedeo Spadaro & François Bourguignon, 2000. "Redistribution et incitations au travail. Une application empirique simple de la fiscalité optimale," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 473-487.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- François Bourguignon & Amadéo Spadaro, 2008.
"Tax-benefit revealed social preferences,"
PSE Working Papers
halshs-00586292, HAL.
- François Bourguignon & Amedeo Spadaro, 2012. "Tax–benefit revealed social preferences," Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 75-108, March.
- Bourguignon, Francois & Spadaro, Amedeo, 2008. "Tax-benefit revealed social preferences," EUROMOD Working Papers EM9/08, EUROMOD at the Institute for Social and Economic Research.
- François Bourguignon & Amadéo Spadaro, 2005. "Tax-benefit revealed social preferences," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590779, HAL.
- François Bourguignon & Amadéo Spadaro, 2005. "Tax-benefit revealed social preferences," Working Papers halshs-00590779, HAL.
- Mohamed Ben Mimoun, 2004. "Redistribution Through Education and Other Mechanisms Under. Capital-Market Imperfections and Uncertainty : A Welfare Effect Analysis," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04110, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Bargain, Olivier, 2004.
"Normative Evaluation of Tax Policies: From Households to Individuals,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1441, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Olivier Bargain, 2008. "Normative evaluation of tax policies: from households to individuals," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 339-371, April.
- Mongin, Philippe, 2008.
"Sur le Revenu de Solidarité Active,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
902, HEC Paris.
- Philippe Mongin, 2008. "Sur le revenu de solidarité active," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 0(4), pages 433-474.
- Philippe Mongin, 2008. "Sur le Revenu de Solidarité Active," ICER Working Papers 18-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- François Bourguignon & Amadéo Spadaro, 2008. "Tax-benefit revealed social preferences," Working Papers halshs-00586292, HAL.
- Amedeo spadaro, 2003.
"Micro-simulation and Normative Policy Evaluation: an Application to some EU Tax-Benefits System,"
DELTA Working Papers
2003-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Amedeo Spadaro, 2005. "Micro-simulation and Normative Policy Evaluation: An Application to Some EU Tax Benefits Systems," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(4), pages 593-622, October.
- Amedeo Spadaro, 2001. "Microsimulation and the Analysis of Redistributive Policies," DELTA Working Papers 2001-14, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Olivier Bargain, 2004. "Evaluation normative des politiques fiscales : du ménage à l'individu," DELTA Working Papers 2004-29, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- François Legendre, 2004. "Micro-simulation et évaluation des politiques économiques et sociale : un panorama des développements récents en France," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 0(1), pages 17-53.
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