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Redistribution et incitations au travail. Une application empirique simple de la fiscalité optimale


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  • François Bourguignon
  • Amedeo Spadaro


[eng] Redistribution and labour supply incentives: a simple application of the optimal tax theory. . A growing concern appeared in many developed countries during the last ten years that generous redistribution systems might be detrimental to those they want to help. By guaranteeing a minimum income or an income supplement to those whose purchasing power would fall below some limit, these systems would be responsible for strong labour-supply disincentives, the cost of which may be very high. In a static framework and under alternative specifications of the labour supply elasticities and the social welfare function, we show, in this paper, that, even if such a mechanism is not in complete disagreement with the Mirrlees optimal tax model, the difference between optimal and real tax rates can be high. The proposed implementation of the optimal tax model can be considered as an original alternative to the standard econometric approach to the analysis of fiscal reforms. [fre] En offrant une garantie de revenu minimum à ceux dont le revenu primaire se trouve en dessous d'un niveau de vie acceptable, les systèmes de redistribution en vigueur dans la plupart des pays européens pourraient détourner du marché du travail, peut-être durablement, les bénéficiaires de cette garantie. Dans une perspective statique et sous des hypothèses alternatives concernant l'élasticité de l'offre de travail et la fonction de bien-être social, on montre ici que, si un tel dispositif n'est pas en complet désaccord avec les enseignements d'un modèle de fiscalité optimale à la Mirrlees, les différences obtenues entre les barèmes optimaux et les barèmes réels de redistribution peuvent néanmoins être considérables. La mise en œuvre proposée ici du modèle de fiscalité optimale constitue une alternative originale aux approches économétriques standard des effets d'une réforme fiscale.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 51 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 473-487

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2000_num_51_3_410529

Note: DOI:10.2307/3503138
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Cited by:
  1. Mongin, Philippe, 2008. "Sur le Revenu de Solidarité Active," Les Cahiers de Recherche 902, HEC Paris.
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590779 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Mohamed Ben Mimoun, 2004. "Redistribution Through Education and Other Mechanisms Under. Capital-Market Imperfections and Uncertainty : A Welfare Effect Analysis," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04110, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  4. Direr, A., 2010. "The taxation of life annuities under adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 50-58, February.
  5. Bargain, Olivier, 2004. "Normative Evaluation of Tax Policies: From Households to Individuals," IZA Discussion Papers 1441, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Trannoy, Alain & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2003. "Voting under ignorance of job skills of unemployed: the overtaxation bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 595-626, March.
  7. repec:ese:emodwp:em9-08 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. François Bourguignon & Amadéo Spadaro, 2005. "Tax-benefit revealed social preferences," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590779, HAL.
  9. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586292 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. François Legendre, 2004. "Micro-simulation et évaluation des politiques économiques et sociale : un panorama des développements récents en France," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 0(1), pages 17-53.


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