IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/reveco/reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_5_410044.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Asymétrie d'information et financement des hôpitaux. Une comparaison des modes d'organisation du système de santé

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Mougeot
  • Florence Naegelen

Abstract

[fre] Cet article considère les relations entre les hôpitaux et une autorité de tutelle (État ou assurance maladie) en situation de risque moral et d'antisélection lorsque la tutelle possède une fonction objectif quasi linéaire. Différents modes d'organisation sont envisagés : contrat bilatéral, concurrence par comparaison (tarification par pathologie) et achat de soins. Lorsque les trois procédures peuvent être mises en œuvre dans des conditions analogues, une hiérarchie est mise en évidence en faveur de l'achat de soins. [eng] In this paper, we consider the relations between a principal (a public agency or a private insurance company) and the hospitals. We suppose that the regulator utility function is quasilinear and that the regulator cannot observe the productivity parameter and the cost reduction effort of the hospitals. We prove that a bilateral contract is dominated by a yardstick competition mechanism and by an auction mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Asymétrie d'information et financement des hôpitaux. Une comparaison des modes d'organisation du système de santé," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(5), pages 1323-1343.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_5_410044
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_5_410044
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Carine Milcent & Dormont Brigitte, 2000. "Prospective payment system and costs of hospital stays [Coûts hospitaliers et tarification par pathologie - Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde aigu]," Post-Print halshs-01990635, HAL.
    2. Martin Janíčko & Ivo Koubek, 2012. "Informační asymetrie a systém dvojího standardu ve vztahu zdravotník - pacient [Information Assymetry and Double Standard in the Doctor-Patient Relationship]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(3), pages 362-379.
    3. Jana Chvalkovská & Petr Janský & Jiří Skuhrovec, 2012. "Listinné akcie na majitele a veřejné zakázky [Bearer Shares in Paper Form and Public Procurement]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(3), pages 349-361.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_5_410044. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/reco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.