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Bearer Shares in Paper Form and Public Procurement

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  • Jana Chvalkovská
  • Petr Janský
  • Jiří Skuhrovec

Abstract

This article examines for the first time the relationship between transparency of ownership structure and (i) profits of firms winning public procurement contracts and (ii) competition for the contracts and savings of the public authority. These characteristics are compared for two groups of public procurement contract winners that differ by their ownership structure. The detailed data from the Czech Republic are used and the firms with bearer shares in paper form serve as the less transparent firms. The results show that less transparent firms have significantly higher profit margins in terms of tens of percentage points and participate in less competitive public procurement contracts and result into lower savings for the public authority. This could be an indirect indicator of conflict of interests or corruption. The article concludes with policy recommendations.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Politická ekonomie.

Volume (Year): 2012 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 349-361

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Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2012:y:2012:i:3:id:846:p:349-361

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Related research

Keywords: Public Procurement; profitability; ownership structure; Czech Republic; corruption; bearer shares in paper form; bearer shares;

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References

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  7. Deborah Haas-Wilson & Martin Gaynor, 1998. "Physician networks and their implications for competition in health care markets," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(2), pages 179-182.
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