Who gets what: the MNE, the national state and the distributional effects of globalization
AbstractGlobalization is the outcome of the interface between national states and MNEs. It is a negotiated solution rather than perfect market equilibrium. Even in a global liberalized world, national states are trying to generate as much welfare for their residents as they can, while MNEs try to maximize their value. This creates a bargaining situation. A stylized game theory model is presented and discussed, in order to gain insights into the income distributional effects of the globalization process. Two important features of the model are: (a) that there is a need for a carefully spelt out strategy, and (b) that optimal solutions depend on an ability to identify the elements of the bargaining where the opportunity cost is low. A case study of the negotiation between the State of Israel and Intel is presented as an illustration for this general model. Journal of International Business Studies (2003) 34, 416–427. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400041
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal Journal of International Business Studies.
Volume (Year): 34 (2003)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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- Ott, Ursula F., 2013. "International Business Research and Game Theory: Looking beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 480-491.
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