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The Optimal Subsidy to Private Transfers Under Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Ralph Chami (International Monetary Fund)
Connel Fullenkamp (International Monetary Fund)

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Abstract

Private income transfers are increasingly viewed as an alternative to government income transfers such as social insurance and foreign aid. This paper models the incentive effects of government-subsidized private transfers and finds that although there is a significant welfare benefit to subsidizing private transfers, there is also a significant welfare cost. It is shown analytically, as well as through simulations, that the optimal subsidy to private transfers falls when the market reaction is taken into consideration. Copyright 2002, International Monetary Fund

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File URL: http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/02/pdf/chami.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan Journals in its journal IMF Staff Papers.

Volume (Year): 49 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 5
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Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:5

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

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