This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Optimal Subsidy to Private Transfers Under Moral Hazard

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ralph Chami (International Monetary Fund)
Connel Fullenkamp (International Monetary Fund)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Private income transfers are increasingly viewed as an alternative to government income transfers such as social insurance and foreign aid. This paper models the incentive effects of government-subsidized private transfers and finds that although there is a significant welfare benefit to subsidizing private transfers, there is also a significant welfare cost. It is shown analytically, as well as through simulations, that the optimal subsidy to private transfers falls when the market reaction is taken into consideration. Copyright 2002, International Monetary Fund

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/02/pdf/chami.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan Journals in its journal IMF Staff Papers.

Volume (Year): 49 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 5
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:5

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/

Order Information:
Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK
Email:
Web: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pal/subscribe/index.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Elizabeth Gale).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. George Kopits, 1997. "Are Europe's Social Security Finances Compatible with EMU?," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 97/3, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Louis Kaplow, 1991. "Incentives and Government Relief for Risk," NBER Working Papers 3007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas & Joulfaian, David & Rosen, Harvey S, 1993. "The Carnegie Conjecture: Some Empirical Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 413-35, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Bernheim, B Douglas & Stark, Oded, 1988. "Altruism within the Family Reconsidered: Do Nice Guys Finish Last?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1034-45, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Stark, Oded, 1993. "Nonmarket transfers and altruism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 1413-1424, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Cutler, David M & Gruber, Jonathan, 1996. "Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 391-430, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Chami, Ralph, 1996. "King Lear's dilemma: Precommitment versus the last word," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 171-176, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-90, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kopits, George, 1997. "Are Europe's Social Security Finances Compatible with EMU?," IMF Papers on Policy Analysis and Assessments 97/3, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  12. Friedman, David D, 1988. "Does Altruism Produce Efficient Outcomes? Marshall versus Kaldor," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 1-13, January.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.