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The Complier Pays Principle: The Limits of Fiscal Approaches Toward Sustainable Forest Management

Author

Listed:
  • By Luc Leruth

    (International Monetary Fund)

  • Remi Paris

    (International Monetary Fund)

  • Ivan Ruzicka

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract

This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches and can actually undermine sustainability. The paper uses the reasoning at the root of the Faustmann solution to draw conclusions on the incentives for sustainable tropical forest exploitation. It proposes a bond mechanism as an alternative market-based instrument to encourage sustainable forest logging while reducing monitoring costs. Copyright 2001, International Monetary Fund

Suggested Citation

  • By Luc Leruth & Remi Paris & Ivan Ruzicka, 2001. "The Complier Pays Principle: The Limits of Fiscal Approaches Toward Sustainable Forest Management," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(2), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:48:y:2001:i:2:p:8
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Karsenty, Alain, 2002. "Le rôle controversé de la fiscalité forestière dans la gestion des forêts tropicales - L’état du débat et les perspectives en Afrique centrale," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 64.
    2. Laurent Debroux & Giuseppe Topa & David Kaimowitz & Alain Karsenty & Terese Hart & Awono Abdon & Fidele Amsini & Conrad Aveling & Alain Bertrand & Mohammed Bekhechi & Carlo Bravi & Eric Chezeaux & Ken, 2007. "Forests in Post- Conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: Analysis of a Priority Agenda," Selected Books, CIRAD, Forest department, UPR40, edition 1, volume 1, number 10.
    3. Kuusela, O.P. & Amacher, G.S. & Moeltner, K., 23. "Performance Bonds in Tropical Timber Concessions: Encouraging the Adoption of Reduced Impact Logging Techniques," Scandinavian Forest Economics: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, issue 44, May.
    4. Alain Karsenty, 2002. "Le rôle controversé de la fiscalité forestière dans la gestion des forêts tropicales - L’état du débat et les perspectives en Afrique centrale," Post-Print hal-01200967, HAL.
    5. Alain Karsenty, 2002. "Le rôle controversé de la fiscalité forestière dans la gestion des forêts tropicales - L’état du débat et les perspectives en Afrique centrale," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 64, pages 5-36.
    6. Alexander J. Macpherson & Douglas R. Carter & Marco W. Lentini & Mark D. Schulze, 2010. "Following the Rules: Brazilian Logging Concessions under Imperfect Enforcement and Royalties," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(3).
    7. Kuusela, Olli-Pekka & Amacher, Gregory S. & Moeltner, Klaus, 2017. "Enforcing the rules in timber concessions: Performance bonding in the presence of corruption risk," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(P1), pages 52-64.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • H39 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Other

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