On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard*
AbstractThis paper expounds on the importance of identifiabilty of subjective probabilities in agency theory with moral hazard. An application to insurance is examined. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2008) 33, 1–18. doi:10.1057/grir.2008.7
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review.
Volume (Year): 33 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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- Edi Karni, 2009. "A Theory of Bayesian Decision Making," EIEF Working Papers Series 0904, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2009.
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