Explaining Insurance Policy Provisions via Adverse Selection
AbstractIn this article, we show that common insurance policy provisions—namely, deductibles, coinsurance, and maximum limits—can arise as a result of adverse selection in a competitive insurance market. Research on adverse selection typically builds on the assumption that different risk types suffer the same size loss and differ only in their probability of loss. In this study, we allow the severity of the insurance loss to be random and, thus, generalize the results of Rothschild and Stiglitz  and Wilson . We characterize the separating equilibrium contracts in a Rothschild-Stiglitz competitive market. By further assuming a Wilson competitive market, we show that an anticipatory equilibrium might be achieved by pooling, and we characterize the optimal pooling contract. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1997) 22, 121–134. doi:10.1023/A:1008616117296
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory.
Volume (Year): 22 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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