The Economics of Natural Resource Extraction: A Primer for Development Economists
AbstractAs developing countries become major consumers of the global supply of commercial energy, it is essential to understand the determinants of future energy prices. At the same time, many developing countries are relying on exports of their own natural resources - tropical hardwoods, oil, tin, gold, and other minerals - to generate badly needed foreign exchange. Government policies influence how much of a resource is extracted today and how much is saved for the future. Flawed policies needlessly waste precious national wealth. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Bank Group in its journal World Bank Research Observer.
Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer, 2008.
"Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1636, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald, 2008. "Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation," Working Papers 34, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer, 2008. "Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001833, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer, 2008. "Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation," Working Papers 960, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer, 2008. "Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation," Documentos de Trabajo 244, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer, 2008. "Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation," NBER Working Papers 13742, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eduardo Ley & Molly K. Macauley & Stephen W. Salant, 1996. "Spatially and Intertemporally Efficient Waste Management: The Costs of Interstate Flow Control," Public Economics 9606001, EconWPA, revised 06 May 1997.
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