Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?
AbstractA public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not related to that which would be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the international patent system as embodied in the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Bank Group in its journal The World Bank Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 19 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- William Jack & Jean O. Lanjouw, 2003. "Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?," Working Papers 28, Center for Global Development.
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Production
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- Patricia M. Danzon & Eric L. Keuffel, 2013. "Regulation of the Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology Industry," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 407-484 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Michael Stolpe, 2003.
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Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(4), pages 437-448, November.
- Michael Stolpe, 2001. "Weltweiter Patentschutz für pharmazeutische Innovationen: Gibt es sozialverträgliche Alternativen?," Kiel Working Papers 1079, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Pedro Barros & Xavier Martinez-Giralt, 2008. "On international cost-sharing of pharmaceutical R&D," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 301-312, December.
- Patricia M. Danzon & Andrew W. Mulcahy & Adrian K. Towse, 2011. "Pharmaceutical Pricing in Emerging Markets: Effects of Income, Competition and Procurement," NBER Working Papers 17174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Julia Fimpel & Michael Stolpe, 2006. "The Welfare Costs of HIV/AIDS in Eastern Europe: An Empirical Assessment Using the Economic Value-of-Life Approach," Kiel Working Papers 1297, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
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