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Research funding randomly allocated? A survey of scientists’ views on peer review and lottery

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  • Axel Philipps

Abstract

The bold idea of random grant allocation is heatedly discussed as an alternative to peer review. The debate centers on advantages and disadvantages of the established measures to control scientific quality, compared to funding by chance. Recently, studies also investigated acceptance of lotteries in the scientific field. However, they provide only inconclusive findings due to their restricted scope. This paper examines scientists’ views on current funding conditions and the idea of random grant distribution. An online survey of PhD holders reveals that most participants are against pure randomness, although they would try random elements if such procedures were combined with peer review. Moreover, while fewer established and recognized scientists differ in their assessments of peer review and expectancies on lotteries’ impact, they hardly vary in their positions on random elements. Funding organizations therefore should be encouraged to further experiment with, and closely examine, practiced lotteries.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Philipps, 2022. "Research funding randomly allocated? A survey of scientists’ views on peer review and lottery," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 365-377.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:scippl:v:49:y:2022:i:3:p:365-377.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/scipol/scab084
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    References listed on IDEAS

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