IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v33y2020i9p4186-4230..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Countercyclical Bank Equity Issuance

Author

Listed:
  • Matthew Baron
  • Itay Goldstein

Abstract

Over the period 1980–2012, large U.S. commercial banks raise and retain less equity during credit expansions, which amplifies their leverage. The decrease in equity issuance is large relative to subsequent banking losses. I consider a variety of explanations for why banks resist raising equity and find evidence consistent with the diminishment of creditor market discipline due to government guarantees. I test this explanation by analyzing the removal of government guarantees to German Landesbank creditors and find that creditor market discipline and equity issuance increase. These findings help explain why banks resist raising equity, making financial distress more likely.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Baron & Itay Goldstein, 2020. "Countercyclical Bank Equity Issuance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(9), pages 4186-4230.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:9:p:4186-4230.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhaa008
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. E. Chrétien & V. Lyonnet, 2017. "Traditional and Shadow Banks during the Crisis," Débats économiques et financiers 27, Banque de France.
    2. Chen, Yehning, 2022. "Bank interconnectedness and financial stability: The role of bank capital," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    3. Laeven, Luc & Götz, Martin & Levine, Ross, 2020. "Do Bank Insiders Impede Equity Issuances?," CEPR Discussion Papers 14913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Reinhardt, Dennis & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon, 2015. "Regulatory arbitrage in action: evidence from banking flows and macroprudential policy," Bank of England working papers 546, Bank of England.
    5. Dieckelmann, Daniel, 2021. "Market sentiment, financial fragility, and economic activity: The role of corporate securities issuance," Discussion Papers 2021/6, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    6. Reiter, Michael & Zessner-Spitzenberg, Leopold, 2023. "Long-term bank lending and the transfer of aggregate risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    7. Tom D. Holden & Paul Levine & Jonathan M. Swarbrick, 2020. "Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2-3), pages 549-582, March.
    8. Manuela M. Dantas & Kenneth J. Merkley & Felipe B. G. Silva, 2023. "Government Guarantees and Banks' Income Smoothing," Papers 2303.03661, arXiv.org.
    9. Anani, Makafui & Owusu, Felix, 2023. "Regulatory capital and bank risk-resilience amid the Covid-19 pandemic: How are the Basel reforms faring?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    10. Faria-e-Castro, Miguel, 2021. "Fiscal policy during a pandemic," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    11. Silva, Felipe Bastos Gurgel, 2021. "Fiscal Deficits, Bank Credit Risk, and Loan-Loss Provisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(5), pages 1537-1589, August.
    12. Manuela M. Dantas & Kenneth J. Merkley & Felipe B. G. Silva, 2023. "Government Guarantees and Banks’ Income Smoothing," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 63(2), pages 123-173, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:9:p:4186-4230.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.