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Why Does an IPO Affect Rival Firms?

Author

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  • Matthew Spiegel
  • Heather Tookes

Abstract

IPO firms’ rivals tend to experience performance declines following an IPO in the industry. Why? We estimate a dynamic structural oligopoly model to distinguish between alternative theories that can explain an industry’s evolution post-IPO. We find that most changes in rivals’ performance are due to industry trends that also drive IPOs. However, we also find some “competitive” IPOs where the IPO enhances the IPO firm’s performance at the expense of competitors. These findings help reconcile prior evidence of average performance reductions of both IPO firms and their rivals with well-known cases in which firms have benefited from going public. (JEL G30, G32)Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Spiegel & Heather Tookes, 2020. "Why Does an IPO Affect Rival Firms?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(7), pages 3205-3249.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:7:p:3205-3249.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhz081
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Spiegel, 2023. "For corporate finance to truly advance we need more genuinely testable models," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 657-661, November.
    2. Bo Becker & Victoria Ivashina, 2023. "Disruption and Credit Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 105-139, February.
    3. Li, Jay Y. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun, 2022. "Product market competition with CDS," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Aghamolla, Cyrus & Thakor, Richard T., 2022. "IPO peer effects," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 206-226.
    5. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Signori, Andrea & Vismara, Silvio, 2023. "The exit choices of European private firms: A dynamic empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Xiaoli Guo & Sicen Chen & Wei Yu & Chengyi Liu, 2022. "Product market competition and controlling shareholders' tunneling: Evidence from China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3820-3832, December.
    7. Yetaotao Qiu & Michel Magnan & Shafu Zhang, 2023. "Competitive threat and strategic disclosure during the IPO quiet period," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 375-416, January.
    8. Frank Packer & Mark M. Spiegel, 2020. "Competitive Effects of IPOS: Evidence from Chinese Listing Suspensions," Working Paper Series 2020-30, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    9. Zhang, Jinjin & Chen, Huili & Zhang, Pengdong & Jiang, Min, 2022. "Product market competition and the value of corporate cash: An agency theory explanation," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    10. Liu, Laura Xiaolei & Lu, Ruichang & Sherman, Ann E. & Zhang, Yong, 2023. "IPO underpricing and limited attention: Theory and evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    11. Li, Yi & Zhang, Wei, 2021. "Another game in town: Spillover effects of IPOs in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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