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Ownership Structure, Voting, and Risk

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  • Amrita Dhillon
  • Silvia Rossetto

Abstract

We analyze the determinants of a firm's ownership structure when decisions over risk are taken by majority vote of risk-averse shareholders. We show that when a fraction of small, diversified shareholders abstains from voting, mid-sized blockholders may emerge to mitigate the conflict of interests between one large shareholder, who prefers less risky investments, and these small, non-voting shareholders. The paper offers a novel explanation for the puzzling observation that many firms have multiple blockholders. The paper develops numerous empirical implications, for example on the link between ownership structure and risk choices and on the relative size of blocks.

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  • Amrita Dhillon & Silvia Rossetto, 2015. "Ownership Structure, Voting, and Risk," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(2), pages 521-560.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:28:y:2015:i:2:p:521-560.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhu071
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandra Casella & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2012. "Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(4), pages 593-658.
    2. Silvia Rossetto & Nassima Selmane & Raffaele Staglianò, 2023. "Ownership concentration and firm risk: The moderating role of mid‐sized blockholders," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1-2), pages 377-410, January.
    3. Annalisa Russino, 2023. "Multiple Blockholders and Firm Value: A Simulation Analysis," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-15, March.
    4. Christian Gollier & Sébastien Pouget, 2022. "Investment Strategies and Corporate Behaviour with Socially Responsible Investors: A Theory of Active Ownership," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(356), pages 997-1023, October.
    5. Amin, Qazi Awais & Cumming, Douglas, 2021. "Blockholders and real earnings management-the emerging markets context," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    6. Malenko, Nadya & Levit, Doron & Maug, Ernst, 2021. "The voting premium," CEPR Discussion Papers 15718, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2020. "Blockholder voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 695-717.
    8. Li, Ziyang & Chen, Yanjun & Li, Yanlin, 2023. "Top management abnormal turnover and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    9. Zhang, Lipai & Li, Biao, 2022. "Mutual supervision or conspiracy? The incentive effect of multiple large shareholders on audit quality requirements," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    10. Ngo, Anh & Duong, Hong & Nguyen, Thanh & Nguyen, Liem, 2020. "The effects of ownership structure on dividend policy: Evidence from seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    11. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Tongurai, Jittima & Vithessonthi, Chaiporn, 2020. "Bank regulations, bank competition and bank risk-taking: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    13. Charléty, Patricia & Fagart, Marie-Cécile & Souam, Saïd, 2019. "Quorum rules and shareholder voting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    14. NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2016. "Self-fulfilling Distortion and Ownership Structure: Market Discipline and Owner fs Dominance at the Dawn of the Japanese Capitalism," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f181, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised 05 Feb 2018.
    15. Chris Mitchell, 2018. "On the Cash-Flow and Control Rights of Contingent Capital," ISER Discussion Paper 1044, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    16. Li Jing & Huiying Zhang, 2023. "Venture Capitalists on Boards and Corporate Innovation," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(3), pages 1-15, February.
    17. Nakabayashi, Masaki, 2019. "Ownership structure and market efficiency," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 189-212.

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