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Finding a Good Price in Opaque Over-the-Counter Markets

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  • Haoxiang Zhu

Abstract

This article offers a dynamic model of opaque over-the-counter markets. A seller searches for an attractive price by visiting multiple buyers, one at a time. The buyers do not observe contacts, quotes, or trades elsewhere in the market. A repeat contact with a buyer reveals the seller's reduced outside options and worsens the price offered by the revisited buyer. When the asset value is uncertain and common to all buyers, a visit by the seller suggests that other buyers could have quoted unattractive prices and thus worsens the visited buyer's inference regarding the asset value. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Haoxiang Zhu, 2012. "Finding a Good Price in Opaque Over-the-Counter Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(4), pages 1255-1285.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:25:y:2012:i:4:p:1255-1285
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhr140
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    Cited by:

    1. Puriya Abbassi & Falk Bräuning & Niels Schulze, 2021. "Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 553-586, June.
    2. Augustin, Patrick & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Wang, Sarah Qian, 2014. "Credit Default Swaps: A Survey," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 1-196, December.
    3. Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Yan, Hong, 2017. "Understanding transactions prices in the credit default swaps market," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-27.
    4. Schultz, Paul, 2012. "The market for new issues of municipal bonds: The roles of transparency and limited access to retail investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 492-512.
    5. Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018. "Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 761-802.
    6. Marco Di Maggio & Marco Pagano, 2018. "Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing [Bargaining with incomplete information]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(1), pages 117-153.
    7. Cenedese, Gino & Ranaldo, Angelo & Vasios, Michalis, 2020. "OTC premia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 86-105.
    8. David W. Berger & Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Andreas R. Kostøl & Simon Mongey, 2023. "An Anatomy of Monopsony: Search Frictions, Amenities, and Bargaining in Concentrated Markets," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2023, volume 38, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Sarah Auster & Nenad Kos & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Optimal Pricing, Private Information and Search for an Outside Offer," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 081, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    10. Christian Opp & Vincent Glode, 2016. "(De)centralizing Trade," 2016 Meeting Papers 1591, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Jaskowski, Marcin & Rettl, Daniel A., 2023. "Information acquisition costs and credit spreads," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    12. Kim, Kyungmin, 2017. "Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 365-399.
    13. Marilyn Pease & Kyungmin Kim, 2014. "Costly Search with Adverse Selection: Solicitation Curse vs. Accelerating Blessing," 2014 Meeting Papers 816, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Chen, Fan & Zhong, Zhuo, 2017. "Pre-trade transparency in over-the-counter bond markets," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 14-33.
    15. Fuess, Roland & Ruf, Daniel, 2015. "Pre-Trade Transparency and Return Co-movements in Commercial Real Estate Markets," Working Papers on Finance 1520, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Jan 2017.
    16. Aquilina, Matteo & Ibikunle, Gbenga & Mollica, Vito & Steffen, Tom, 2022. "The visible hand: benchmarks, regulation, and liquidity," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    17. Vayanos, Dimitri & Wang, Jiang, 2013. "Market Liquidity—Theory and Empirical Evidence ," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1289-1361, Elsevier.
    18. Chague, Fernando & De-Losso, Rodrigo & De Genaro, Alan & Giovannetti, Bruno, 2017. "Well-connected short-sellers pay lower loan fees: A market-wide analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 646-670.

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