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Good IPOs Draw in Bad: Inelastic Banking Capacity and Hot Markets

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  • Naveen Khanna
  • Thomas H. Noe
  • Ramana Sonti

Abstract

We posit that screening IPOs requires specialized labor which is in fixed supply. A sudden increase in demand for IPO financing increases the compensation of IPO screening labor. This results in reduced screening, encouraging sub-marginal firms to enter the IPO market, further fueling the demand for screening labor. The model's conclusions are consistent with empirical findings of increased underpricing during hot markets, positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing, and with tipping points between hot and cold markets. Finally, the model makes sharp predictions relating the IPO market to fundamental values of firms and to investment banking returns. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Naveen Khanna & Thomas H. Noe & Ramana Sonti, 2008. "Good IPOs Draw in Bad: Inelastic Banking Capacity and Hot Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(5), pages 1873-1906, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2008:i:5:p:1873-1906
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhm018
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    Cited by:

    1. Hu, Yunzhi, 2022. "A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & He, Jie, 2011. "IPO waves, product market competition, and the going public decision: Theory and evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 382-412, August.
    3. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2013. "Ratings quality over the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 62-78.
    4. Blomkvist, Magnus & Korkeamäki, Timo & Takalo, Tuomas, 2022. "Learning and staged equity financing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    5. Evgeny Lyandres & Fangjian Fu & Erica X. N. Li, 2018. "Do Underwriters Compete in IPO Pricing?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 925-954, February.
    6. Gunay, Erdal & Ursel, Nancy, 2015. "Underwriter competition in accelerated seasoned equity offerings: Evidence from Canada," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 94-110.
    7. Charles W. Calomiris & Yehuda Izhakian & Jaime F. Zender, 2019. "Underwriter Reputation, Issuer-Underwriter Matching, and SEO Performance," NBER Working Papers 26344, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Premti, Arjan & Madura, Jeff, 2013. "Motives and consequences of IPOs in cold periods," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 486-496.
    9. Fodor, Andy & Gokkaya, Sinan, 2014. "Option implied volatilities and the cost of issuing equity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 88-101.
    10. Boeh, Kevin & Dunbar, Craig, 2014. "IPO waves and the issuance process," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 455-473.
    11. Hertzel, Michael G. & Huson, Mark R. & Parrino, Robert, 2012. "Public market staging: The timing of capital infusions in newly public firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 72-90.
    12. Liu, Laura Xiaolei & Lu, Ruichang & Sherman, Ann E. & Zhang, Yong, 2023. "IPO underpricing and limited attention: Theory and evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    13. Boeh, Kevin K. & Dunbar, Craig, 2016. "Underwriter deal pipeline and the pricing of IPOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 383-399.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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