Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Market Making, Prices, and Quantity Limits

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dupont, Dominique
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This article develops a model of spread and depth setting under asymmetric information where the equilibrium depth is proportionally more sensitive than the spread to changes in the degree of information asymmetry. The analysis uses a one-period model in which a risk-neutral, monopolistic market maker faces a price-sensitive liquidity trader and a better informed trader who is alternatively risk neutral and risk averse. The equilibrium depth can take values ranging from 0 to infinity, depending on the information asymmetry, the asset volatility, and the strength of the liquidity demand, while the spread remains positive and finite. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.

    Volume (Year): 13 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 1129-51

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:13:y:2000:i:4:p:1129-51

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27513 USA.
    Fax: 919-677-1714
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.rfs.oupjournals.org/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www4.oup.co.uk/revfin/subinfo/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Bülent, Köksal, 2008. "Participation Strategy of the NYSE Specialists to the Trades," MPRA Paper 30512, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Frino, Alex & Gerace, Dionigi & Lepone, Andrew, 2008. "Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2581-2588, December.
    3. Gajewski, Jean-François & Quéré, Bertrand ¨P., 2013. "A Comparison of the Effects of Earnings Disclosures on Information Asymmetry: Evidence from France and the U.S," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-25.
    4. Fishe, Raymond P. H. & Robe, Michel A., 2004. "The impact of illegal insider trading in dealer and specialist markets: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 461-488, March.
    5. Köksal, Bülent, 2010. "Participation strategy of the NYSE specialists to the posted quotes," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 314-331, December.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:13:y:2000:i:4:p:1129-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.