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The Disturbing Interaction between Countercyclical Capital Requirements and Systemic Risk

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  • Bálint L. Horváth
  • Wolf Wagner

Abstract

We present a model in which flat (state-independent) capital requirements are undesirable because of shocks to bank capital. There is a rationale for countercyclical capital requirements that impose lower capital demands when aggregate bank capital is low. However, such capital requirements also have a cost as they increase systemic risk taking: by insulating banks against aggregate shocks (but not bank-specific ones), they create incentives to invest in correlated activities. As a result, the economy’s sensitivity to shocks increases and systemic crises can become more likely. Capital requirements that directly incentivize banks to become less correlated dominate countercyclical policies as they reduce both systemic risk-taking and cyclicality.

Suggested Citation

  • Bálint L. Horváth & Wolf Wagner, 2017. "The Disturbing Interaction between Countercyclical Capital Requirements and Systemic Risk," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(4), pages 1485-1511.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:21:y:2017:i:4:p:1485-1511.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfx001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Taejin Kim & Vishal Mangla, 2019. "Capital Regulation with Two Banking Sectors: Cyclicality and Implementation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(2-3), pages 485-537, March.
    2. Koresh Galil & Margalit Samuel & Offer Moshe Shapir & Wolf Wagner, 2023. "Bailouts and the modeling of bank distress," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 7-30, February.
    3. Kosenko, Konstantin & Michelson, Noam, 2022. "It takes more than two to tango: Multiple bank lending, asset commonality and risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    4. Lee, Junyong & Lee, Kyounghun & Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2023. "The effectiveness of capital controls and macroprudential measures," KDI Journal of Economic Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI), vol. 45(4), pages 1-22.
    5. Biswas, Sonny & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2022. "Bank capital structure and regulation: Overcoming and embracing adverse selection," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 973-992.
    6. Biswas, Swarnava S. & Gómez, Fabiana, 2018. "Contagion through common borrowers," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 125-132.
    7. Wolf Wagner & Jing Zeng, 2023. "Too-many-to-fail and the Design of Bailout Regimes," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 230, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Systemic risk; Regulation; Countercylical capital requirements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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