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Network Regulation

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  • Simon Cowan

Abstract

This paper assesses how price regulation for energy, water, telecommunications, and rail networks has developed in the two decades since incentive regulation was introduced. Regulation is necessary because Coasean bargaining is unlikely to produce efficient outcomes, and because the consumer and the firm have relationship-specific capital and are unable to write long-term contracts. Incentive regulation has been successful at promoting operating efficiency in the UK and elsewhere. Incentive regulation has, so far, also been successful at promoting investment, but some challenges remain for regulators and policy-makers. The relationship between the required cost of capital and the extent to which prices are allowed to track costs is explored, and the implications of the recent large increases in debt-to-equity ratios for regulation is discussed. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Cowan, 2006. "Network Regulation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 22(2), pages 248-259, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:22:y:2006:i:2:p:248-259
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    Cited by:

    1. Shaw, Rita & Attree, Mike & Jackson, Tim, 2010. "Developing electricity distribution networks and their regulation to support sustainable energy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(10), pages 5927-5937, October.
    2. Ming Chung Chang & Hsiao‐Ping Peng, 2009. "Structure Regulation, Price Structure, Cross‐Subsidization And Marginal Cost Of Public Funds," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(6), pages 675-698, December.
    3. Banovac, Eraldo & Gelo, Tomislav & Simurina, Jurica, 2007. "Analysis of economic characteristics of a tariff system for thermal energy activities," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 5591-5600, November.
    4. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    5. Georg Meran, 2012. "Europäische Preisregulierungssysteme in der Wasserwirtschaft: Konzepte und Umsetzungsprobleme," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 81(1), pages 167-181.

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