On the International Harmonization of Bank Regulation
AbstractThis paper offers a three-way typology of bank regulation and examines the question of international harmonization for each category. For economic regulation, the danger is that harmonization could support and preserve domestic protectionist regulatory regimes, but it could instead be a beneficial guise for lowering protectionist barriers; the latter efforts should be encouraged. For prudential regulation, national regulation should be adequate to handle the extra stresses of international banking. Harmonization efforts (e.g. the Basle accord) may offer only modest help; but the Accord may offer indirect help, by limiting national governments' competitive efforts implicitly to subsidize their banks' risk-taking activities. Finally, for information regulation, national regulation appears to be adequate, and international harmonization does not appear to be necessary. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 10 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://oxrep.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Roman Matousek, 1998. "The Czech Banking System in the Light of Regulation and Supervision: Selected Issues," Archive of Monetary Policy Division Working Papers 1998/05, Czech National Bank.
- McShane, Michael K. & Cox, Larry A. & Butler, Richard J., 2010. "Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 522-532, March.
- Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2012. "Supervising Cross-Border Banks: Theory, Evidence and Policy (Revised version of CentER Discussion Paper 2011-127)," Discussion Paper 2012-059, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
- Beck, T.H.L. & Todorov, R.I. & Wagner, W.B., 2011. "Bank Supervision Going Global? A Cost-Benefit Analysis (Replaced by CentER DP 2012-059)," Discussion Paper 2011-127, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.