IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v56y2004i1p64-87.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Currency boards and currency crises

Author

Listed:
  • Gregor Irwin

Abstract

This paper demonstrates how a currency board can become vulnerable to a crisis in which the policymaker is forced to devalue. The model is built from two blocks: first, incomplete information about the devaluation cost faced by the policymaker; and second, unemployment persistence. Incomplete information can result in multiple equilibria. In one class of equilibrium the policymaker has a credibility problem and maintaining the currency board is costly in terms of unemployment. If unemployment is persistent then pressure to devalue can build up over time until it becomes unbearable and the policymaker is forced to devalue. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregor Irwin, 2004. "Currency boards and currency crises," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 64-87, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:56:y:2004:i:1:p:64-87
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:got:cegedp:36 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Joao Loureiro & Manuel M.f. Martins & Ana Paula Ribeiro, 2010. "Cape Verde: The Case For Euroisation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 78(3), pages 248-268, September.
    3. Switgard Feuerstein & Oliver Grimm, 2006. "On the Credibility of Currency Boards," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 818-835, November.
    4. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2004_022 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Olli Castrén & Tuomas Takalo & Geoffrey Wood, 2010. "Unemployment Persistence And The Sustainability Of Exchange Rate Pegs," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(1), pages 85-102, February.
    6. Bleaney, Michael & Gundermann, Marco, 2007. "Stabilizations, crises and the "exit" problem - A theoretical model," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 876-890, December.
    7. Oliver Grimm, 2007. "Fiscal Discipline and Stability under Currency Board Systems," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 07/66, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    8. Neven Valev & John Carlson, 2007. "Beliefs about Exchange‐Rate Stability: Survey Evidence from the Currency Board in Bulgaria," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 111-121.
    9. Katsimi, Margarita, 2008. "Exchange rate strategies towards the euro-zone for new EU member states with currency boards," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 1043-1063, September.
    10. Castrén, Olli & Takalo, Tuomas & Wood, Geoffrey, 2004. "Labour market reform and the sustainability of exchange rate pegs," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 22/2004, Bank of Finland.
    11. Feng, Shu & Fu, Liang & Ho, Chun-Yu & Alex Ho, Wai-Yip, 2023. "Political stability and credibility of currency board," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    12. Takalo, Tuomas & Castrén, Olli & Wood, Geoffrey, 2004. "Labour market reform and the sustainability of exchange rate pegs," Working Paper Series 406, European Central Bank.
    13. Neven T. Valev & John A. Carlson, 2007. "Beliefs about Exchange-Rate Stability: Survey Evidence from the Currency Board in Bulgaria," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 111-121.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:56:y:2004:i:1:p:64-87. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.