Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework

Contents:

Author Info

  • Pattanaik, Prasanta K
  • Suzumura, Kotaro

Abstract

The authors propose a framework for the analysis of social choice and welfare which uses the informational basis of individual preference orderings over the pairs of conventionally defined social alternatives and social decision-making mechanisms. In particular, they consider the case where the decision-making mechanism is a rights-structure modeled as game forms. The authors use this framework to clarify the role for individual preferences in conferring rights, in the realization of the conferred rights, and in describing the formal contents of rights. They also explore its implications for the controversial issue of the consistency of social choice and A. K. Sen's paradox of Paretian libertarianism. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%28199604%292%3A48%3A2%3C194%3AIRASEA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P&origin=bc
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 48 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 194-212

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:2:p:194-212

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Email:
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 1999. "Characterizations of Consenquentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper Series a365, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Polly Vizard, 2005. "The contributions of Professor Amartya Sen in the field of human rights," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6273, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Sebastiano Bavetta & Marco Del Seta, 2001. "Constraints and the Measurement of Freedom of Choice," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 213-238, May.
  4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:103-114 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Enrico Guzzini, 2010. "Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 103-114.
  6. Bernard Steunenberg, 2001. "Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 351-370, December.
  7. Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000. "Consequences, Opportunities, and Generalized Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper 5, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Manimay Sengupta, 1996. "Informed Planner, Decentralized Decisions And Incentive Compatibility," Discussion Paper Series 12, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Oct 1996.
  9. Polly Vizard, 2005. "The Contributions of Professor Amartya Sen in the Field of Human Rights," CASE Papers 091, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:2:p:194-212. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.