Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework
AbstractThe authors propose a framework for the analysis of social choice and welfare which uses the informational basis of individual preference orderings over the pairs of conventionally defined social alternatives and social decision-making mechanisms. In particular, they consider the case where the decision-making mechanism is a rights-structure modeled as game forms. The authors use this framework to clarify the role for individual preferences in conferring rights, in the realization of the conferred rights, and in describing the formal contents of rights. They also explore its implications for the controversial issue of the consistency of social choice and A. K. Sen's paradox of Paretian libertarianism. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 48 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Other versions of this item:
- Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Kotaro Suzumura, 1992. "Individual Rights and Social Evaluations: A Conceptual Framework," Discussion Paper Series a250, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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- Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 1999.
"Characterizations of Consenquentialism and Non-consequentialism,"
Discussion Paper Series
a365, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2001. "Characterizations of Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 423-436, December.
- Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000. "Characterizations of Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper 3, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:103-114 is not listed on IDEAS
- Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000.
"Consequences, Opportunities, and Generalized Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism,"
5, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2003. "Consequences, opportunities, and generalized consequentialism and non-consequentialism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 293-304, August.
- Polly Vizard, 2005. "The Contributions of Professor Amartya Sen in the Field of Human Rights," CASE Papers 091, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.
- Bernard Steunenberg, 2001. "Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 351-370, December.
- Enrico Guzzini, 2010. "Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 103-114.
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