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The Role of Information in Social Welfare Judgements

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  • Kelsey, David

Abstract

This paper criticizes the claim that the Arrow Impossibility Theorem arises from an attempt to make social welfare judgments based on inadequate information. This paper shows how it is possible to modify conventio nal social choice to include those kinds of information the absence o f which is said to be responsible for the Arrow Theorem. However, a v ery similar impossibility theorem can be proved in the new framework. This suggests that there is a need to base welfare judgments on card inal utilities (or some similar kind of information). The author anal yzes the Liberal Paradox in terms of the framework proposed in the pa per. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 39 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 301-17

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:39:y:1987:i:2:p:301-17

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Cited by:
  1. BLACKORBY, Charles & BOSSERT, Walter & DONALDSON, David, 2004. "Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism," Cahiers de recherche 2004-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  2. Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 2004. "Multi-Profile Welfarism : A Generalisation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 710, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. A. Baujard, 2006. "From moral welfarism to technical non-welfarism : A step back to Bentham’s felicific calculus of its members," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200606, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  4. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 2002. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 459-541 Elsevier.
  5. BLACKORBY, Charles & BOSSERT, Walter & DONALDSON, David, 2005. "Intertemporal Social Evaluation," Cahiers de recherche 2005-06, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  6. BLACKORBY, Charles & BOSSERT, Walter & DONALDSON, David, 2002. "In Defense of Welfarism," Cahiers de recherche 2002-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

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