Delivery-Contingent Contracts for Research
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Volume (Year): 9 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2010.
"Procurement when Price and Quality Matter,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/99378, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2007. "Procurement when Price and Quality Matter," CEPR Discussion Papers 6082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2006. "Procurement When Price and Quality Matter," Working Papers 06-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013.
"Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
401, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Bergmann, Rouven & Friedl, Gunther, 2008. "Controlling innovative projects with moral hazard and asymmetric information," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 1504-1514, October.
- Ciccotello, Conrad S. & Hornyak, Martin J., 2000. "Cooperation via contract: An analysis of research and development agreements," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008.
"Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information,"
2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 251, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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