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Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms

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  • David S. Evans

Abstract

Many online businesses seek and provide attention. These online attention rivals provide products and features to obtain the attention of consumers and sell some of that attention, through other products and services, to merchants, developers, and others who value it. The multi-sided business of seeking and providing attention is fluid with rivalries crossing boundaries defined by the features of the products and services. It is also dynamic. Rivals introduce new products and services, some involving drastic and frequent innovation. Online attention rivals impose competitive constraints on one another. Product differentiation tempers the significance of these constraints in particular situations. But the relevant differentiation mainly involves aspects of the attention that is procured and sold rather than, necessarily, particular features of the products and services used for acquiring and delivering that attention. Antitrust analysis should consider these competitive constraints in evaluating market definition, market power, and the potential for anticompetitive effects. The existence of competition among attention rivals does not imply that antitrust should reduce the vigor with which it examines mergers and exclusionary practices among these platforms. It just needs to look for problems in the right places.

Suggested Citation

  • David S. Evans, 2013. "Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 313-357.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:313-357.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nht014
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bodo Herzog, 2018. "Valuation of Digital Platforms: Experimental Evidence for Google and Facebook," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-13, October.
    2. Gaenssle, Sophia & Budzinski, Oliver, 2019. "Stars in social media: New light through old windows?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 123, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    3. Evgeny N. Smirnov & Sergey A. Lukyanov, 2020. "Imperatives of global digital platform management," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 11(4), pages 59-69, September.
    4. Just, Natascha, 2018. "Governing online platforms: Competition policy in times of platformization," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(5), pages 386-394.
    5. Beatriz Kira & Vikram Sinha & Sharmadha Srinivasan, 2021. "Regulating digital ecosystems: bridging the gap between competition policy and data protection [Merger policy in digital markets: an ex post assessment]," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 30(5), pages 1337-1360.
    6. Liang Li, 2019. "Data and market definition of Internet-based businesses," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 20(1), pages 54-85, March.
    7. Malecki, Edward J., 2017. "Real people, virtual places, and the spaces in between," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 3-12.
    8. Oliver Budzinski & Sophia Gaenssle & Nadine Lindstädt-Dreusicke, 2021. "The battle of YouTube, TV and Netflix: an empirical analysis of competition in audiovisual media markets," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(9), pages 1-26, September.
    9. Nam, Sangjun & Kwon, Youngsun, 2022. "Quantifying different psychological costs of user behavioral info for overcoming the 'take-it-or-leave-it' condition," 31st European Regional ITS Conference, Gothenburg 2022: Reining in Digital Platforms? Challenging monopolies, promoting competition and developing regulatory regimes 265662, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    10. Tim Meyer & Anna Kerkhof & Carmelo Cennamo & Tobias Kretschmer, 2022. "Competing for Attention on Information Platforms: The Case of News," CESifo Working Paper Series 9832, CESifo.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General

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