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A unified theory of market partitioning: an integration of resource-partitioning and sunk cost theories

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  • Christophe Boone
  • Arjen van Witteloostuijn

Abstract

Our objective was to integrate a sociological and an economic theory of market partitioning into a unifying framework: Glenn Carroll's resource-partitioning and John Sutton's sunk cost theories, respectively. In so doing, two important theory fragments from organizational ecology and industrial organization are integrated in an attempt to understand the antecedents and consequences of so-called dual market structures. A dual market structure features high concentration and high density, two market structure conditions that in most extant theory are thought to be unrelated. We argue that both theory fragments are highly complementary, offering different stories about the evolution of competition that produce similar market structure outcomes. In terms of the competitive strategies and organizational forms involved, however, the accounts of dual market structure evolution in the resource-partitioning and sunk cost theories are very different. This is instrumental in developing a dynamic theory of Porterian strategic management. We use these insights to reinterpret existing evidence, discussing a series of well-known industry studies. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Boone & Arjen van Witteloostuijn, 2004. "A unified theory of market partitioning: an integration of resource-partitioning and sunk cost theories," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 13(5), pages 701-725, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:13:y:2004:i:5:p:701-725
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    Cited by:

    1. ZHOU, Chaohong & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory," Working Papers 2009002, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    2. César García-Díaz & Arjen van Witteloostuijn & Gábor Péli, 2015. "Micro-Level Adaptation, Macro-Level Selection, and the Dynamics of Market Partitioning," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(12), pages 1-27, December.
    3. Peng, George Z. & Beamish, Paul W., 2019. "Subnational FDI Legitimacy and Foreign Subsidiary Survival," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 1-1.
    4. ZHOU, Chaohong & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory," ACED Working Papers 2009001, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    5. BOONE, Christophe & WEZEL, Filippo Carlo & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2006. "An ecological theory of population-level organizational diversity," Working Papers 2007003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    6. Michael I.C. Nwogugu, 2019. "Complex Systems, Multi-Sided Incentives and Risk Perception in Companies," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-44704-3.

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