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The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer Relationship

Author

Listed:
  • Robert A. McGuire

    (Department of Economics, University of Akron, Akron, OH 44325.)

  • T. Norman Van Cott

    (Department of Economics, Ball State University, Muncie, IN 47306.)

Abstract

This article offers an example of a national constitution, that of the Confederate States of America, which effectively constrained its fiscal authorities to tax rates on the lower end of the Laffer relationship. The taxes were Confederate import tariffs. Drawing on primary sources, the paper documents the role that this de facto capping of tariff rates played in the history of the drafting of the Confederate Constitution. That the Laffer relationship found constitutional expression for an important tax suggests that the "tariff" might have played a more significant role in the North--South conflict than is currently acknowledged. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert A. McGuire & T. Norman Van Cott, 2002. "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer Relationship," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(3), pages 428-438, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:3:p:428-438
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cutsinger, Bryan P. & Ingber, Joshua S., 2019. "Seigniorage in the Civil War South," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 74-92.
    2. Phillip Magness, 2009. "Constitutional tariffs, incidental protection, and the Laffer relationship in the early United States," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 177-192, June.
    3. Ben Baack & Robert A. McGuire & T. Norman Van Cott, 2009. "Constitutional Agreement during the Drafting of the Constitution: A New Interpretation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 533-567, June.
    4. Hugo Pinto-de-Abreu & Elísio Brandão & Samuel Pereira, 2015. "Across Tax Mountains Assessing the Impact of Competition on the Laffer Curve," International Journal of Financial Economics, Research Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 4(1), pages 57-84.
    5. Abuselidze, George, 2011. "The prospects of budget revenue in the aspect of optimal tax burden," MPRA Paper 85634, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Robert Ekelund & John Jackson & Mark Thornton, 2010. "Desperation votes and private interests: an analysis of Confederate trade legislation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 199-214, July.
    7. Hugo Miguel de Oliveira Cruz Pinto de Abreu & Elísio Fernando Moreira Brandão & Samuel Cruz Alves Pereira, 2014. "Crossing Mountains: The Effect of Competition on the Laffer Curve," FEP Working Papers 523, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    8. Abuselidze, George, 2015. "Formation of Tax Policy in the Aspect of the Optimal Tax Burden," MPRA Paper 86277, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Jun 2015.

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