Teaching Tools: A Simple Principal-Agent Experiment for the Classroom
AbstractIn this note, the authors describe a simple, flexible, and instructive moral hazard experiment. It can be used in a variety of classes, including principles classes, to illustrate the basic incentive conflicts in principal-agent interactions, the importance of information, and the power of reputational enforcement. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 35 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- W. Doyle Smith, 2002. "Applying Angelo's Teacher's Dozen to Undergraduate Introductory Economics Classes: A Call for Greater Interactive Learning," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 539-549, Fall.
- Michael H. Kennedy, 2012. "Using Online Courseware to Play a Simulation Illustrating the Concept of Moral Hazard in Health Care," International Review of Economic Education, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 11(1), pages 67-77.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.