This paper applies a positive theory of legislation to explain the development of the 1984 Drug Price Competition Act and the Patent Term Restoration Act. Specifically, it examines why regulatory reforms prior to 1984 were stalemated and why the 1984 legislation was enacted. Results show that, prior to 1984, members of the key congressional committees had preferences in which the proposed bills could not beat the status quo. However, changes in subcommittee membership in the House combined with a change in the majority party in the Senate created a situation in which the 1984 legislation could defeat the status quo. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.
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