The Demise of Hospital Philanthropy
AbstractThe authors develop a one-period model of hospital and donor behavior to analyze how insurance for hospital care, various public subsidies, and other factors affect donations to hospitals. Theoretically, increased insurance coverage has an ambiguous effect on private giving. Empirical tests using time series and cross-sectional data show that the growth of private insurance, and especially the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid, substantially reduces private giving to hospitals. Effects of public subsidies for construction depend on whether the subsidy more closely resembles a matching or lump-sum grant. Coauthors are Thomas J. Hoerger, Michael A. Morrisey, and Mahud Hassan. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 28 (1990)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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