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Agency Growth, Salaries and the Protected Bureaucrat

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  • Johnson, Ronald N
  • Libecap, Gary D

Abstract

In contrast to numerous assertions in the literature on bureaucratic behavior that government employees seek to promote the growth of their agencies to increase their salaries, this paper offers empirical evidence indicating the absence of a significant positive relationship between agency growth and salaries. The impact of agency growth on salaries is estimated using a random sample of individual federal white-collar employees. Inspection of civil service rules reveals that most federal employees are highly insulated from fluctuations in agency staffing or budget appropriations. The existence of a highly protected bureaucracy raises questions about the control and performance of federal workers. Copyright 1989 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1989. "Agency Growth, Salaries and the Protected Bureaucrat," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(3), pages 431-451, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:27:y:1989:i:3:p:431-51
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    Cited by:

    1. Julie Hewitt & Daniel Brown, 2000. "Agency Costs in Environmental Not-For-Profits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 163-183, April.
    2. Libecap Gary D., 2001. "The Problem of an Autonomous Bureaucracy in Transition Economies: Lessons from the American Experience," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-13, March.
    3. R. Richard Geddes, 2008. "Pricing by state-owned enterprises: the case of postal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(7), pages 575-591.
    4. Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts offered by bureaucrats," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
    5. Pema, Elda & Mehay, Stephen, 2010. "The role of job assignment and human capital endowments in explaining gender differences in job performance and promotion," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 998-1009, December.
    6. Boland, Matthew & Godsell, David, 2021. "Bureaucratic discretion and contracting outcomes," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).

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