Reaganomics and Reputation Revisited
AbstractThis paper considers a reformulation of David Backus and John Driffil's (1985) model of credibility following a change in regime. Following G uido Tabellini (1987), the author alters their model to better fit ma croeconomic policymaking as it is formulated in the United States whe re monetary and fiscal policies are made by independent policymakers. By assuming that policymakers of divergent views have recently enter ed office and so have no track record, the game's equilibrium corresp onds to the U.S. experience during the first years of the Reagan admi nistration. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 26 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Herman Bennet & Norman Loayza O., 2002. "Sesgos de política económica cuando las autoridades fiscales y monetarias tienen objetivos diferentes," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, vol. 5(1), pages 123-156, June.
- Norman Loayza & Herman Bennett, 2004. "Policy Biases under Lack of Coordination," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 349, Econometric Society.
- Dieter Proske, 1995. "Zentralbankunabhängigkeit - Diskussion auf falschen Wegen," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 21(4), pages 533-554.
- Herman Bennett & Norman Loayza, 2000.
"Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities have Different Objectives,"
Working Papers Central Bank of Chile
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- Herman Bennett & Norman Loayza, 2002. "Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Have Different Objectives," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.), Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 11, pages 299-330 Central Bank of Chile.
- Herman Bennett C. & Norman Loayza O., 2000. "Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities have Different Objectives," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 3(2), pages 53-72, August.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1992. "Political models of macroeconomic policy and fiscal reform," Policy Research Working Paper Series 970, The World Bank.
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