This paper considers a reformulation of David Backus and John Driffil's (1985) model of credibility following a change in regime. Following G uido Tabellini (1987), the author alters their model to better fit ma croeconomic policymaking as it is formulated in the United States whe re monetary and fiscal policies are made by independent policymakers. By assuming that policymakers of divergent views have recently enter ed office and so have no track record, the game's equilibrium corresp onds to the U.S. experience during the first years of the Reagan admi nistration. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 26 (1988) Issue (Month): 2 (April) Pages: 253-63 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:26:y:1988:i:2:p:253-63
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