Do Audits Deter or Provoke Future Tax Noncompliance? Evidence on Self-Employed Taxpayers
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Cited by:
- Matthias Kasper & James Alm, 2022.
"Does the Bomb-crater Effect Really Exist? Evidence from the Laboratory,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 87-111.
- Matthias Kasper & James Alm, 2021. "Does the “bomb crater” effect really exist? Evidence from the laboratory," Working Papers 2118, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Pietro Battiston & Simona Gamba & Alessandro Santoro, 2020. "Optimizing Tax Administration Policies with Machine Learning," Working Papers 436, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2020.
- Kasper, Matthias & Alm, James, 2022.
"Audits, audit effectiveness, and post-audit tax compliance,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 87-102.
- Matthias Kasper & James Alm, 2020. "Audits, Audit Effectiveness, and Post-audit Tax Compliance," Working Papers 2010, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Emmanuelle Deglaire & Peter Daly & Fabrice Lec, 2021.
"Exposure to tax dilemmas deteriorate individuals' self-declared tax morale,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 363-397, December.
- Emmanuelle Deglaire & Peter Daly & Fabrice Le Lec, 2021. "Exposure to tax dilemmas deteriorate individuals' self-declared tax morale," Post-Print hal-03593787, HAL.
- Hebous, Shafik & Jia, Zhiyang & Løyland, Knut & Thoresen, Thor O. & Øvrum, Arnstein, 2023.
"Do Audits Improve Future Tax Compliance in the Absence of Penalties? Evidence from Random Audits in Norway,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 305-326.
- Shafik Hebous & Zhiyang Jia & Knut Løyland & Thor O. Thoresen & Arnstein Øvrum, 2020. "Do audits improve future tax compliance in the absence of penalties? Evidence from random Audits in Norway," Discussion Papers 943, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Shafik Hebous & Zhiyang Jia & Knut Løyland & Thor Olav Thoresen & Arnstein Øvrum, 2020. "Do Audits Improve Future Tax Compliance in the Absence of Penalties? Evidence from Random Audits in Norway," CESifo Working Paper Series 8480, CESifo.
- Eberhartinger, Eva & Safaei, Reyhaneh & Sureth, Caren & Wu, Yuchen, 2021. "Are risk-based tax audit stretegies rewarded? An analysis of corporate tax avoidance," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 267, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
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Keywords
public administration; public finance; taxation; tax evasion; compliance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
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