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Marriage and Trust: Some Lessons from Economics

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Author Info
Rowthorn, Robert
Abstract

This paper examines the role of marriage as an institution for providing couples with the confidence to make long-term investments in their relationship. No-fault divorce has undermined the notion of marriage as a contract, thereby reducing the security offered by marriage and promoting opportunism by men. This has weakened the bargaining power of wives, both within marriage and when divorce occurs. Current legal reforms will improve the economic position of all divorced wives, including those who are primarily responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. The latter feature will encourage opportunism by women and make men less prepared to invest in their marriage. The paper argues that the only way to achieve parity between men and women, and deter opportunism by either sex, is to return to fault-based divorce. Both divorce settlements and the custody of children should depend on preceding marital conduct. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Cambridge Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 23 (1999)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 661-91
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Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:23:y:1999:i:5:p:661-91

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  1. Wolfers, Justin, 2003. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," Research Papers 1819, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Helmut Rainer, 2003. "Should We Write Prenuptial Contracts?," Economics Discussion Papers 572, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Homero Cuevas, 2000. "La teoría económica, el afecto y la familia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 2(2), pages 13-36, January-J. [Downloadable!]
  4. Steven Horwitz & Peter Lewin, 2008. "Heterogeneous human capital, uncertainty, and the structure of plans: A market process approach to marriage and divorce," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.


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