Heterogeneous human capital, uncertainty, and the structure of plans: A market process approach to marriage and divorce
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal The Review of Austrian Economics.
Volume (Year): 21 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100335
Capital heterogeneity; No-fault divorce; Marriage; Marriage-specific human capital; Market process; Plan disequilibrium; Covenant marriage; D10; D13; D80; J22; J24; K19;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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- Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
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- Chiswick, Carmel U & Lehrer, Evelyn L, 1990. "On Marriage-Specific Human Capital: Its Role as a Determinant of Remarriage," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 193-213, October.
- Peters, H Elizabeth, 1992. "Marriage and Divorce: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 687-93, June.
- Steven Horwitz, 2005. "The functions of the family in the great society," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 669-684, September.
- Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana & Lemennicier, Bertrand, 2000. "Marriage contracts and the law-and-economics of marriage: an Austrian perspective," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 665-690, June.
- Allen, Douglas W., 1998. "No-fault divorce in Canada: Its cause and effect," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 129-149, October.
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