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The New Standing Disaster Program: A SURE Invitation to Moral Hazard Behavior

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  • Vincent H. Smith
  • Myles Watts

Abstract

The new Supplemental Agricultural Disaster Assistance (SURE) program, established by the 2008 Farm Bill, mandates disaster payments for individual farms that experience crop losses in excess of 50% of their average production, whether or not those farms are located in regions affected by catastrophic events. This study shows that, because of this provision, the SURE program creates substantial incentives for moral hazard behaviors in many market-related situations. These incentives are especially severe when market prices equal or fall below prices at which farmers value commodity losses for federal crop insurance purposes.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent H. Smith & Myles Watts, 2010. "The New Standing Disaster Program: A SURE Invitation to Moral Hazard Behavior," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 32(1), pages 154-169.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:apecpp:v:32:y:2010:i:1:p:154-169.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aepp/ppp003
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hsing-Hsiang Huang & Michael R. Moore, 2018. "Farming under Weather Risk: Adaptation, Moral Hazard, and Selection on Moral Hazard," NBER Chapters, in: Agricultural Productivity and Producer Behavior, pages 77-124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Claassen, Roger & Cooper, Joseph C. & Carriazo, Fernando, 2011. "Crop Insurance, Disaster Payments and Land Use Change: The Effect of Sodsaver on Incentives for Grassland Conversion," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 1-17, May.
    3. Yu, Jisang & Hendricks, Nathan P., 2017. "Crop Insurance Moral Hazard from Price and Weather Forecasts," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258336, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Jisang Yu & Nathan P. Hendricks, 2020. "Input Use Decisions with Greater Information on Crop Conditions: Implications for Insurance Moral Hazard and the Environment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(3), pages 826-845, May.
    5. Dylan Turner & Francis Tsiboe, 2022. "The crop insurance demand response to the Wildfire and Hurricane Indemnity Program Plus," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 1273-1292, September.
    6. Ranjan Kumar Ghosh & Shweta Gupta & Vartika Singh & Patrick S. Ward, 2021. "Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(1), pages 293-320, February.
    7. Claassen, Roger & Carriazo, Fernando & Cooper, Joseph C. & Hellerstein, Daniel & Ueda, Kohei, 2011. "Grassland to Cropland Conversion in the Northern Plains: The Role of Crop Insurance, Commodity, and Disaster Programs," Economic Research Report 262239, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    8. Ubilava, David & Barnett, Barry J. & Coble, Keith H. & Harri, Ardian, 2011. "The SURE Program and Its Interaction with Other Federal Farm Programs," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1-19.
    9. Bekkerman, Anton & Smith, Vincent H. & Watts, Myles J., 2012. "The SURE Program: An Investigation of Moral Hazard Opportunities and Adverse Selection Effects," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124178, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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