Guilt Shall Not Escape or Innocence Suffer? The Limits of Plea Bargaining When Defendant Guilt is Uncertain
AbstractThis article examines optimal prosecutor behavior with respect to plea bargaining when defendant guilt is uncertain. I show that when jury beliefs and behavior are determined endogenously in equilibrium along with defendant and prosecutor behavior, plea bargaining can play only a limited role in managing society's conflicting desires to maximize punishment of the guilty and minimize punishment of the falsely accused. In particular, while it can be optimal for prosecutors to use plea bargaining to induce a large fraction of guilty defendants to voluntarily sort themselves from the innocent, such sorting must come at the cost of imposing relatively short sentences on such guilty defendants who accept plea bargains. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal American Law and Economics Review.
Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- ANCELOT Lydie, 2010. "EquitÃ© du plaider coupable : une analyse Ã©conomÃ©trique dans trois tribunaux de grande instance franÃ§ais," Working Papers of BETA 2010-09, Bureau d'Economie ThÃ©orique et AppliquÃ©e, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2010. "Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham 10-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- repec:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-14-00005 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2010. "Credible plea bargaining," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 279-293, June.
- McCannon, Bryan C., 2010. "Homicide trials in Classical Athens," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 46-51, March.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2010. "Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham 10-28, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
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