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The Italian Demerit Point System, six years later. A "Beckerian" story?


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  • Benedettini Simona
  • Nicita Antonio
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    Sono passati diversi anni dall'introduzione della patente a punti in Italia. L'analisi dei dati dimostra che l'entrata in vigore del nuovo meccanismo sanzionatorio non ha prodotto particolari effetti deterrenti sui comportamenti di guida degli Italiani, sia sulle autostrade che sulle strade diverse da queste ultime. Fatta eccezione per talune violazioni, per le quali si osserva una temporanea riduzione a seguito dell'entrata in vigore della patente a punti, quest'ultima sembra in generale aver fallito nel raggiungimento delle proprie finalità. Un'interpretazione beckeriana sembra suggerire che le ragioni di tale insuccesso non siano imputabili al meccanismo in sé, che in altri paesi ha registrato buoni risultati, ma alla specifica declinazione che ne è stata fatta in Italia.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Società editrice il Mulino in its journal Mercato Concorrenza Regole.

    Volume (Year): (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 323-354

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    Handle: RePEc:mul:jhpfyn:doi:10.1434/30214:y:2009:i:2:p:323-354

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    Keywords: demerit point system; compliance; deterrence; road safety; traffic law enforcement;


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    Cited by:
    1. Antonio Nicita & Simona Benedettini, 2012. "The Costs of Avoiding Accidents.Selective Compliance and the 'Peltzman Effect' in Italy," Department of Economics University of Siena 631, Department of Economics, University of Siena.


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