This paper invokes foundational property rights theories to explain the persistence of insecure tenure in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. The case studies affirm the theories' core propositions: when relative factor prices change, actors seek more narrowly defined rights to newly valued resources. Their efforts may be blocked by costly decision-making rules, distributional conflict, or the inabiltiy to credibly commit to the new rights. This paper also highlights the way in which culture - the beliefs, rituals, and practices that promote a community's share understanding or mode of behavior - circumscribes actors' choice sets, and, thus, influences the path of institutional change.
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Volume (Year): 156 (2000) Issue (Month): 3 (September) Pages: 513- Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
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