IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urnsici0932-4569(200003)1561_35tpfocs_2.0.tx_2-p.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Political Foundation of Chinese Style Gradualism: A Paradox of too Strong Private Interests?

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Henning
  • Xiaobo Lu

Abstract

We present a game-theoretical model of policy reforms focused on institutional reforms of the political system. We show that (i) gradual reforms in China can be understood as the result of a relatively weak organization of private interests unable to replace the Communist Party at once, but strong enough to credibly demand reforms. (ii) Gradual transition, may be preferable in comparison to a big-bang transition if private interests are largely fragmented. (iii) A dilemma of too strong private interests exists: They may collectively prefer a gradual transition, but due to their commitment problem are forced into a big-bang transition.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Henning & Xiaobo Lu, 2000. "The Political Foundation of Chinese Style Gradualism: A Paradox of too Strong Private Interests?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(1), pages 1-35, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200003)156:1_35:tpfocs_2.0.tx_2-p
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elitsa R. Banalieva & Kimberly A. Eddleston & Thomas M. Zellweger, 2015. "When do family firms have an advantage in transitioning economies? Toward a dynamic institution-based view," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(9), pages 1358-1377, September.
    2. Catherine Locatelli & Dominique Finon, 2004. "The failure of introducing market institutions in a rent sector into an economy in transition," Post-Print halshs-00001302, HAL.
    3. Roland Kirstein & Stefan Voigt, 2006. "The Violent and the Weak," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 863-889, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H49 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200003)156:1_35:tpfocs_2.0.tx_2-p. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/jite .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.