The Regulation of British Telecom: An Event Study
AbstractIn this paper, we use event-study methods to analyze the post-privatization regulatory regime applying to telecommunications in the UK. Our results suggest that telecoms regulation has not been captured in an overall sense, although there is an heterogeneous pattern of regulatory events. The results are consistent with recent observations of Spiller and Vogelsang, who argue that the regulatory framework for UK telecoms is designed to maintain substantial checks on the regulator's discretion, operating mainly through the rule of law. Our broad conclusion is that the impacts of regulation indicate a relatively soft attitude to British Telecom up to 1995, when a tightening of regulation tended to offset the previous bias.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 155 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bel, Germà & Trillas, Francesc, 2005.
"Privatization, corporate control and regulatory reform: the case of Telefonica,"
Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-51, February.
- Germa Bel & Francesc Trillas, 2004. "Privatization, Corporate Control and Regulatory Reform: The case of Telefonica," Finance 0409053, EconWPA.
- Russell Smyth & Magnus Söderberg, 2010. "Public interest versus regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 292-312, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.