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The Paradox of Legal Unification

Author

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  • Bertrand Crettez
  • Olivier Musy

Abstract

In the games used to study legal standardization, legal unification is never the outcome of the usual cooperative solution. Given the importance of legal unificationin practice, this property appears as a paradox. To solve this paradox, we resortto alternative notions of cooperation. We show that introducing other-regarding preferences or Kantian rules of behavior does not resolve the paradox except ina very peculiar case. By contrast, we show that legal uniformity prevails at any Berge equilibrium of our legal standardization game. This, we argue, is a first step towards a solution to the paradox of legal unification.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Crettez & Olivier Musy, 2021. "The Paradox of Legal Unification," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(1), pages 97-119.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2020-0047
    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0047
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    Cited by:

    1. Ünveren, Burak & Donduran, Murat & Barokas, Guy, 2023. "On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 1-20.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    legal unification; other-regarding preferences; Kantian equilibrium; Berge equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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