IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mes/jeciss/v42y2008i3p633-647.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Chilean Pension System at 25 Years: The Evolution of a Revolution

Author

Listed:
  • Gregory J. Buchholz
  • Alberto Coustasse
  • Patricio Silva
  • Peter Hilsenrath

Abstract

The 1981 reform of the Chilean pension system was revolutionary at its time. It was the first instance of a mature public Pay-As-You-Go social security system being converted into a mandatory defined contribution system managed by the private sector. This paper contends that a unique confluence of events were responsible for this change. The rise of a dictatorship in Chile, a struggling public retirement system, and a cadre of Chicago oriented economists determined to make Chile a model free market neoliberal economy. This was later followed by the Washington Consensus and the promotion of Chilean reform by the World Bank. This paper analyzes the Chilean reform and its subsequent development; evaluating it on both efficiency and equity grounds. While the evidence for efficiency gains is mixed there is little doubt that equity has suffered under the new system. Nevertheless, it continues to evolve and equity concerns are increasingly being addressed.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory J. Buchholz & Alberto Coustasse & Patricio Silva & Peter Hilsenrath, 2008. "The Chilean Pension System at 25 Years: The Evolution of a Revolution," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(3), pages 633-647, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:42:y:2008:i:3:p:633-647
    DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2008.11507171
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00213624.2008.11507171
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/00213624.2008.11507171?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luciano Fanti, 2012. "PAYG pensions and fertility drop: some (pleasant) arithmetic," Discussion Papers 2012/147, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:42:y:2008:i:3:p:633-647. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/MJEI20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.