This paper presents a conceptual framework of problem loan resolution choices that is a function of the combined borrower and lender decisions. A bank will choose a workout option if its expected value is greater than the outcome under a no-workout plan. For the borrower, if the reputational penalty due to a default is less than the opportunity cost of the best new alternative, the borrower will have an incentive to default. If the reverse holds then the borrower will be better-off with a loan workout. Using a unique data set composed of borrower, lender and economic factors we empirically examine the problem loan resolution choices. The, results provide support for our conceptual framework that problem loan choices are based on combined borrower/lender variables. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.
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Volume (Year): 27 (1995) Issue (Month): 1 (February) Pages: 202-16 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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